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Some Legal Problems of State
Trading in Southeast Asia
Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe*
I. INTRODUCTON
State trading-trade conducted internationally by a state or public
agency-has become a feature of the mixed economies of southeast
Asia. With the growing importance of economic planning and the
increase of state intervention (often tantamount to absolute control)
in areas of the economy of individual southeast Asian countries, there
has been an expansion of international trading functions by states
or public agencies. Much of this trade is conducted at a state to
state level, i.e., on a bilateral basis. This kind of infrastructure is
attributable in part to the fact that the Communist bloc countries
generally either have no place for the private trader or else regard
him with particular caution. Ceylon's bilateral trade is a result of
its market instability and its search for economic independence. Al-
though its dealings are largely with Communist China, it is unlikely
that Ceylon will make a permanent shift out of world markets in
favor of total bilateral trade. India's trade with the Soviet bloc, on
the other hand, is motivated largely by the desire to display economic
and political neutrality by opening its gates to trade with all coun-
tries. In the case of Burma, expansion of markets for rice at a time
when it was having difficulty selling in its traditional markets was,
perhaps, the crucial factor. The situation of Indonesia, whose po-
sition in the world market for primary products was particularly
strong, is more difficult to explain. It is possible that the Sino-Soviet
bloc found in Indonesia a useful source for much needed materials
and offered her especially attractive terms for her industrial develop-
ment in return for those materials; in addition, a good deal of po-
litical sympathy for Communist China within Indonesia led to a
certain acquiescence in bilateralism, even though the nature of the
Indonesian economy did not warrant any such predisposition.1
Bilateral trading of this variety creates economic problems for both
developing countries and free economies in spite of whatever ad-
B.A., 1955, LL.B., 1956, Cantab; LL.M., 1958, Harvard, Ph.D., 1964, Ceylon.
Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Ceylon; Yorke Ptizeman of the University of
Cambridge; Consultant to the Government of Ceylon on International Law; Sometime
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1. For an examination of bilateral trading in southeast Asia see, inter alia, Behrman,
State Trading by Undeveloped Countries, 24 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 454 (1959).
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vantages it may have. Similarly it raises legal problems specifically
connected with the operation of the most favoured nation clause,
even within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Even so, it is not this kind of bilateral trade that gives rise
to significant legal problems of international interest in connection
with state trading in southeast Asia; rather it is the trade between
state or public enterprises and foreign individuals or non-state bodies.
There are several public enterprises which have commercial trading
powers in the countries of southeast Asia. In India, it is the function
of the two airline corporations to provide safe, efficient, economical
and co-ordinated air transport, internal or international or both.2
This involves not only contracts of carriage with foreigners, but also
contracts for the purchase of airplanes and other equipment. In
Ceylon, section 5 of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act of 1961
states that:
The general objects of the Corporation shall be-
(a) to carry on business as an importer, exporter, seller, supplier or
distributor of petroleum; and
(b) to carry on any such other business as may be incidental or conducive
to the attainment of the objects referred to in paragraph (a).
A subsequent statute gave this public corporation a monopoly in re-
gard to the petroleum business in Ceylon. It has the power to
purchase petroleum products from foreign countries; and, although
at present purchases are made from foreign state sources, there is
much business done in the field of lubricants with American busi-
ness enterprises. In the future the proposed state oil refinery will
probably find itself dealing with private foreign-crude-oil sources.
Another example of a state trading enterprise is the Cooperative
Wholesale Establishment of Ceylon, which has power to import goods
for the purpose of supplying the needs of the co-operative societies.
3
Such goods would include anything from pins to heavy machinery
such as tractors. The public business corporation is also to be found
in other countries of southeast Asia, including Burma, Indonesia and
even Malaysia. Apart from the public corporation, there may be
circumstances in which the state directly engages in the import or
export of goods, but this a rarer phenomenon.
The international legal problems created by the entry of the public
corporation into the field of commerce in southeast Asia are, per-
haps, no different in kind from those created by the presence of the
public trading corporation in Western democracies. These problems
2. GLEDHIL., India, in 6 THE BRIsTi COMMIONWEALTH: THE DEVELOPMENT or
ITS LAWS AND CoNsTrrtrroNs 352 (1964).
3. Cooperative Wholesale Establishment Act, Act No. 47 of 1949, § 2(2) (Ceylon).
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may take a more acute form in southeast Asia, however, as a result
of political factors and the clash of interests arising from the fact that
the states involved are poorer or less developed. Also, economic
difficulties no doubt serve to highlight legal problems. Thus, when
a change in government causes embarrassment in diplomatic rela-
tions with the national state of the foreign contracting party, the
state entity may desire to disregard already existing contractual rela-
tions at the expense of the foreign contracting party or at the expense
of a crisis in the balance of trade. In addition, exchange and other
financial conditions may lead to hardship in fulfilling contractual obli-
gations. Such factors may in strict legal terms have little bearing on
state contractual relations. Nevertheless, the solution of these prob-
lems creates especially acute difficulties for the foreign contractor.
The legal problems that do arise from the phenomenon of state
trading may be said to concern (1) the foreign individual or private
corporation, and (2) the most suitable protection of his or its interests
against the generally more powerful and privileged position of the
state trader. These legal problems are generally less severe in trade
with foreign individuals than in trade with private corporations.
Ultimately, however, the issue revolves around the protection of
human rights against the power of the state entity. Further legal
difficulties for the state entity may result from political changes or
economic deficiencies within its own state, which generally have little
to do with the position of the other contracting party.
Viewed from the converse, state trading has repercussions on the
nationals of southeast Asian states. Nationals of Ceylon, India, and
others trade with the Communist bloc both in the export and import
markets. Automobiles are imported from Czechoslovakian state trad-
ing entities by private Ceylonese firms; Chinese textiles are imported
by Indonesian dealers; and private firms export Ceylonese tea to
China. Thus, the private entities in southeast Asian states, though
to a lesser extent than private entities outside such states, often con-
tract with foreign state traders. As such, the protection of these
private entities may well be at stake in the resolution of state trading
legal difficulties.
The international legal problems which arise where one party in
the trading transaction is the state or a state entity may be discussed
under the following heads: the problem of the immunity of the state
from the jurisdiction of municipal courts; the problem of the associ-
ation of public entities with the state for the purpose of the above
immunity; the problem of a non-municipal jurisdiction and law for




II. THE IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM THE JURISDICTION OF
MUNICPnAL COURTS
A. Resolution of Disputes in the State Trader's Courts
P, an Indian, contracting with a Soviet trade organization may
wish to have any disputes settled in a Soviet court; or X, an Ameri-
can, may wish to have any problems under his contract with the
Ceylon government resolved by a Ceylonese court. Both of these
situations raise the issue of sovereign immunity of the state trader
within that state itself. Because the foreigner may find it more
advantageous to have a decision of the state trader's judiciary to
support him, the question of sovereign immunity is of practical im-
portance.
In most southeast Asian states, the state is not immune from the
jurisdiction of its courts with respect to contracts;4 therefore, the
foreigner will find the courts of southeast Asian state traders to be
a possible forum for settling disputes. The southeast Asian courts
will not always be available, however, where the foreign contractor
wishes to frame his case in tort against the state. The law of Ceylon,
perhaps unique in southeast Asia, grants the state immunity in tort
actions.5 There also can be no execution against the state in Ceylon.
In regard to public corporations engaged in trade, the Ceylonese po-
sition is different. These corporations generally enjoy no immunities
either with respect to actions or execution, provided they have a
separate legal personality from the state (as is generally the case).
Thus, the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, which has a separate legal
personality as a body corporate, may be sued in its own name and
execution can be levied against it. Corporations which do not have
such a separate legal personality, though, would stand in the same
position as the state.
Where the state trader is not a southeast Asian state and the other
contracting party is a national of a southeast Asian state, the same
sort of problem arises. The answer varies with the particular state
involved. Suffice it to note that Anglo-American notions of sovereign
immunity have undergone some measure of change since 1940,6 while
in the Soviet Union the only legal entities capable of entering into
foreign trading relations are subject to the Foreign Trade Arbitra-
4. For Ceylon see Jayawardene v. Queen's Advocate, 4 S.C.C. 77 (1881). Sections
299 and 300 of the Indian Constitution contemplate actions against the state.
5 See A.-G. v. Nadaraja, 59 N.L.R. 136 (1956).
6. See, e.g., The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 44, § 1 in
England.
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tion Commission.7 In Anglo-American law execution against the state
as such would be precluded.
B. Resolution of Disputes in Courts Other Than Those
of the State Trader
The nonstate contracting party may find it to his advantage to
seek settlement of his dispute in courts other than those of the state
trader for a variety of reasons. The issue that arises is whether state
A, in whose courts the action is brought against the state trader, will
assume jurisdiction over the dispute. The nonstate contracting party,
it must be remembered, may be a national of a southeast Asian state
or of another state, while the state trader seeking immunity from the
jurisdiction of state courts may or may not be a southeast Asian state.
Also the state whose jurisdiction the nonstate contracting party seeks
to invoke may or may not be a southeast Asian state.
Whether the courts of state A will assume jurisdiction depends upon
their attitude toward the doctrine of sovereign immunity.8 There are
two possible views that a state may take regarding jurisdictional im-
munity of foreign states in connection with trading activities. On
the one hand, there is the absolutist view, which regards the foreign
state's jurisdictional immunity as unqualified, irrespective of the fact
that it engages in trading activity. This view is reflected in the case
of The Porto Alexandro9 in England and is generally supported by
the Soviet Union. Although it has been criticized by certain mem-
bers of the House of Lords, 10 the Porto decision has never been over-
ruled. It is possible that the Commonwealth courts in southeast Asia
might follow this view."1 The other view is that immunity is restricted
rather than absolute. This approach has sprung up largely as a result
of increased participation by the state in economic activities. 12 It is
7. See Ramzaitsev, The Application of Private International Law in Soviet Foreign
Trade Practice, 1961 J. Bus. L. 343.
8. The choice of view has been regarded as a matter largely within the discretion
of the courts of individual states, though in fact the choice should turn on some
compelling norm of international law since the matter concerns international relations.
The practice of state courts is not regarded as having created any single norm of
international law of a universally binding nature. On the contrary, the limits of
discretion have been generally regarded as unusually wide.
9. [1920] P. 30. See also Compafiia Mercantil Argentia v. United States Shipping
Bd., 40 T.L.R. 601 (1924).
10. See Compaiiia Naviera Vascongado v. "Cristina' S.S., [19381 A.C. 485, at 496
(Lord Thankerton), 521 (Lord Maugham).
11. There are other states outside the Commonwealth, that might take this view.
See Collins, Effectiveness of the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 4 CoLum.
. Tr&NSNATL L. 119, 120 (1965).
12. See Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HAnv. L.
REV. 614, 627 (1950); Reeves, Leviathan Bound-Sovereign Immunity in a Modern
World, 43 VA. L. REv. 529 (1957).
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based upon a distinction between activities of the state done iure
imperii (in its sovereign or public capacity) and those done lure
gestionis (in its private capacity) and has been variously interpreted
by the courts of different states, including Italy, Belgium, Austria,
Switzerland and Germany. 13 The United States apparently adheres to
a restrictive view of immunity.14 But, as has been pointed out by
Lauterpacht, the distinction is difficult to apply and has led to contra-
dictory decisions in similar situations in different states.15 In any
event, the potentialities of the distinction in bringing the trading ac-
tivities of states within the purview of state courts would seem to be
dependent too much upon the vagaries of judicial predeliction. Re-
cently it was held by a Dutch court that the activities of the state
in refining and marketing petroleum could not be classified as acts
done iure imperii.'6 Hence, even where courts adopt a restrictive
view of immunity along traditional lines, there is no guarantee that
a party trading with a state trader will find a receptive forum.
Furthermore, a clause in the contract by which the state trader
undertakes to submit to a particular jurisdiction will not be operative
as a waiver of immunity before English courts, nor possibly before
the courts of other states which adopt English precedents. Even where
a municipal court assumes jurisdiction over a dispute in which a state
trader is involved, there is no guarantee that it will necessarily permit
execution against such state trader.'8 This factor is a further limitation
on the individual's opportunities of using municipal resources for the
satisfaction of his claims.
State practice, as it presently stands, does not hold out particularly
sanguine hopes for the individual who engages in business with states.
There is no guarantee he will have his disputes satisfactorily settled
through the courts of states other than the one with which he trades.
As long as the courts of states, whether in southeast Asia or else-
where, are likely to proceed along established lines, municipal settle-
ment by a non-party to the transaction would not seem to be par-
ticularly helpful at present. Perhaps, the solution lies in a doctrine
under which the type of function or activity determines the immunity;
hence, a trading activity would per se be excluded from the operation
13. Sucirmuu=L, S TE IMMUNnTEs AND TRADING AcTnvrls 218, 233, 242 (1959):
SWENEY, INTEPNATIONAL LAW OF SOvEr EIGN IMmUNITY 26 (1963).
14. See SucHArnrwL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 182; Collins, supra note 11, at 121.
15. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28
Bart. YB. INr'L L. 220 (1951).
16. Cabolent v. National Iranian Oil Co. (1965), 5 INTL LEGAL MATERIALS 477
(1966).
17. Duff Dev. Co. v. Kelantan, [1924] A.C. 797.
18. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930); Duff
Dev. Co. v. Kelantan, supra note 17.
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of immunity regarding both adjudication over the dispute and execu-
tion.19 Since it canont be ignored that convenience, effectiveness, and
economy may dictate the choice of a municipal forum by an indi-
vidual who has relations with a state trader, the law of foreign
sovereign immunity can usefully be reformed to suit the demands of
modem international society.
III. TBE IMMUNITY OF PUBLIC ENTrrIs FROM = JUmIsDICTION
OF MUNICIPAL COURTS
The government trading corporation, an institution that has de-
veloped in a large number of countries and which combines the
power of government with the flexibility and initiative of a private
enterprise, also creates problems in regard to immunity from juris-
diction. Such a corporation generally has a distinct legal personality
of a corporate nature under the municipal law of the incorporating
state, as does, for example, the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation or the
Indian Airline Corporation. The Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act
states in section 3 that the corporation shall "be a body corporate
and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and may
sue and be sued in such name." While a corporation of this kind
may have a separate legal personality in municipal law, the govern-
ment sometimes has extensive power to control its activities. In the
Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act, for instance, it is stated in section 7
that the Minister of Trade and Commerce of the government may
give the Board of Directors "general or special directions in writing
as to the exercise of the powers of the Corporation, and such Board
shall give effect to such directions." In spite of the separation of
corporate legal personality from that of the incorporating state, it
would seem that generally corporations of this kind are firmly under
the control of the government.20 The problem that arises is whether
these corporations can be sued in the municipal courts of states.
In regard to the courts of the state in which the corporation is
incorporated, there seems to be no problem. The incorporating
statute ordinarily gives the corporation the power to sue and be
sued; hence, it is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
incorporating state. It would seem that these corporations are also
treated in the same way as private corporations regarding execution.
The problem arises in connection with the courts of states other
than the state of incorporation. The question is whether these courts
19. See Friedmann, Changing Social Arrangements in State-Trading States and Their
Effect on International Law, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 350, 354 (1959).
20. See Baccus S.R.L. v. Servieio Nacional del Trigo, [1957] 1, Q.B. 438, where the
position of the Spanish Servicio Nacional del Trigo, which had corporate status under
Spanish law, was in issue.
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will regard such corporations as immune from jurisdiction. The an-
swer depends, to some extent, on whether such courts adopt a re-
strictive or absolute theory of immunity. In England, where the
courts are generally understood to follow an absolute view of im-
munity, a Spanish government corporation with separate legal person-
ality which was engaged in the import and export of grain for the
government was held to be entitled to immunity-apparently because
it was substantially under the control of the Spanish Minister of
Agriculture.21 In another English decision, in which it was held that
the Soviet Tass Agency was not a separate legal corporation but a
part of the Soviet government machinery, it was stated obiter by
Lord Justice Cohen that:
A sovereign government may so incorporate a particular department of
State as to make it plain that it is to be an ordinary trading, commercial
or business activity and not to be part of the State so that it can claim
immunity, but . . . I should not, without further argument, be prepared
to accept the view, that it necessarily followed that, because a department
of State was granted incorporation it was deprived thereby of the right to
assert its sovereign immunity in foreign courts.22
Thus, it would seem clear under the view of the English courts which
are regarded as the chief proponents of the absolutist theory of sover-
eign immunity, that mere incorporation as a separate legal entity,
according to the law of the state concerned, will not suffice to de-
prive a public trading corporation of its immunity as a state trader.
It is difficult to speculate what test would be applied by such courts
to determine whether a legal entity separate from the state is to be
entitled to the immunity of the state. It is not clear, for instance,
whether the distinction is between the public corporation, to which
immunity will be granted, and the joint-stock company controlled
by government, which will not be covered by the immunity, or
whether it is between the corporation that is controlled in some sense
by the government (immune) and one that is not so controlled
(not immune) 23
Even in those states where the restrictive view of immunity is ac-
cepted, the fact that a trader is a separate legal entity from the state
21. Id. at 466.
22. Krajina v. Tass Agency, [1949] 2 All E.R. 274, 281.
23. Wedderbum thinks that the latter is the proper one. Wedderburn, Sovereign
Immunity of Foreign Public Corporations, 6 mr'L & Comp. L.Q. 290 (1957). For a
discussion of the problem see also Cohn, Immunity of Foreign Trading Government
Departments, 73 L.Q. REv. 29 (1957); Fawcett, Legal Aspects of State Trading, 25
Bart. YB. INT'L L. 34 (1948); Fensterwald, supra note 12; Kuhn, The Extension of
Sovereign Immunity to Government-Owned Commercial Corporations, 39 Am. J. INT'L
L. 772 (1945); Schmitthoff, The Claim of Sovereign Immunity In the Law of Inter-
national Trade, 7 INTL & ComP. L.Q. 452 (1958); de Visscher, La Protection Diplo-
matique des Personnes Morales, 102 HAGUE tEcuEI Fs Couns 399 (1961).
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does not seem to be the sole criterion determining whether such a
public corporation should be amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts.
Thus in the Netherlands, the National Iranian Oil Company was
recently held to be entitled to immunity, although it was a separate
legal entity, on the ground that it was performing the functions of
the state iure imperii.24 This decision illustrates how elusive the
distinction between acts iure imperii and acts iure gestionis can be.
In some states, however, courts have had little difficulty in holding
that separate legal entities which engage in trade are not entitled to
immunity. 5 The practice of the United States courts seems to be that
public corporations with legal personalities separate from the state
will be deprived of their immunity when engaging in trade.
28
It is clear that the approach taken by the adherents of the absolutist
theory of immunity is unsatisfactory in that it fails to recognize social
realities; however, the iure gestionis/iure imperii distinction of the
public commercial enterprises, 27 whether directly government-con-
trolled or not, cannot be denied. The answer to the question whether
international law should permit public trading entities with separate
legal personalities to claim immunity from the jurisdiction of state
courts should rest on the development of rules which will ensure the
general equilibrium of rights and responsibilities among states with
differing social, political and economic organizations. Excluding a
public corporation which engages in trade from the jurisdiction of
state courts is illogical because such a corporation holds itself out as
legally separate from the state and engages in an activity which should
normally be subject to the adjudication of state courts. It would
seem improper to place it above the legal framework which governs
ordinary commercial relations between individuals, even though it
may be performing functions on behalf of the state. The problem is
not one which should be solved on the basis of a distinction between
acts done lure gestionis and acts done iure imperii or on the basis of
a concept of control by the government, i.e., the executive arm of the
state; but rather on the principle that any commercial function should
be subject to municipal jurisdiction, including commercial activity by
the state itself. The accident of public control of a commercial opera-
tion, then, would not confer on a legal entity a specially privileged
24. Cabolent v. National Iranian Oil Co., supra note 16.
25. E.g., France. SucaAnarxmI, op. cit. supra note 13, at 136.
26. See SucaHAruL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 120. Contra, Friedmann, supra note
19, at 359.
27. See the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. For discussion of this term see
Sn MumMAp, THE LEGAL FnAxvnsvom OF WOMD TMADE 229 (1959); Friedmann,
International Public Corporations, 6 MoDERN L. REv. 185 (1943), in PuBLIc Ex=ER-




status through exemption from legal jurisdiction. It is probable that
trading in southeast Asia would experience benefits rather than set-
backs by the acceptance of such a principle.
IV. A NoN-Mu ciPAL LAw AND JUSDICTION FOR
m Co'rnaCruAL NExus
What law and jurisdiction can govern a contract between a state
trader and an alien?2 The recently discovered proposition, dependent
on practice, that there may be other principles of law governing a
contract between state and alien than the municipal law of the state-
party to the contract raises acutely the problem of the proper law
of the contract. An accompanying issue is that of jurisdiction over
disputes arising out of the contract. The situation of the state trader
in southeast Asia or of the southeast Asian national trading with other
states may very well give rise to these problems by virtue of the
balance of bargaining power.
A. Jurisdiction Conferred on Tribunals of a "Transnational"
Legal System
To take the issue of jurisdiction first, the problem arises when the
parties to the contract purport to confer jurisdiction on a tribunal
which is apparently unconnected with an identifiable municipal legal
system.
As to the object of this device, it is probably intended that the
jurisdiction of the municipal courts of the state-party to the contract
should be excluded and that the remedies should be provided by an
independent tribunal not connected with that legal system. The
parties realize that the municipal courts of the state-party would be
bound to give effect to their own law, including both the conflict
rules pertaining to choice of law governing the contract, which might
be unfavourable to the alien, and, more particularly, the legislation
of that state which might even alter the character of the contract.
29
28. For a more detailed analysis and discussion of this problem see chapter 3 of a
book by the present author entitled STATE REsPONSIBnLrY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS, to
be published shortly by the Oxford University Press, England.
29. The Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd.-National Iranian Oil Co. (Switz. 1963), in 13
[NT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1011 (1964) [hereinafter cited throughout as the Sappire-NIOC
arbitration]. Discussions of agreements of this kind between state or state-owned
agency and aliens may be found in VEDnRoss, VAmRA Jinus CENTrUM 355 (1959);
Bourquin, Arbitration and Economic Development Agreements, 15 Bus. LAv 860
(1960); Carabiber, L'Arbitrage International entre Gouvernments at Particuliers, 76
HAcUE REcuEn DES Coxes 221 (1950); Carabiber, L'2volution de l'Arbitrage Commer-
cial International, 99 HArUE REcuEIM DES Covns 119 (1960); Delaume, The Proper
Law of Loans Concluded by International Persons: A Restatement and a Forecast, 56
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What effect shall be given to such a device is a more difficult
question to answer. In general, legal thinking has confined itself
to postulating two kinds of legal systems: the international legal
system and the municipal legal system. The choice between these
alternatives, however, may not always produce a solution. For ex-
ample, if the arbitrators are to be appointed by agreement between
the parties and it is not otherwise apparent that the contract is sub-
ject to a municipal system, it might be difficult to locate a municipal
system with jurisdiction. Where it is apparent that no specific mu-
nicipal system has jurisdiction, the presumption is that jurisdiction
is to be attributed to the municipal system of the state party to the
contract; or if this system does not permit the assumption of juris-
dicion, it is presumed that the contract has not created legal rela-
tions. Neither alternative is attractive for it is clear that in these cases
as in others the parties are intent on creating legal relations, although
they may wish to void the municipal system of the state party.
A solution would seem to lie in postulating a third kind of legal
system which is dependent to some extent on the choice of the parties
for its relevance. It may conveniently be called a "transnational"'3
system, the tribunal which has jurisdiction being a tribunal of this
system. Such a system could not be said to be identical with the
international legal system as presently conceived since it would in-
volve a state and an individual in the absence of state-to-state rela-
tions. On the other hand, it would seem to approximate a municipal
system of a simple nature; thus, it may be regarded as belonging to
the same genre as municipal systems.
This "transnational" system has several main characteristics: (1)
resort to it is dependent entirely upon choice by the parties to the
contract, whereas resort to municipal courts and tribunals might not
be; (2) such choice has a binding nature apart from the contract
itself; (3) at present it consists of tribunals created by the parties
which are generally ad hoc; and (4) it does not have any organized
system of enforcement, the system of law which its tribunals admin-
Am. J. INT'L L. 63 (1962); Hyde, Economic Development Agreements, 105 HAGUE
REcu-m Ds Cou's 269 (1962); Lalive, Contracts Between a State or a State Agency
and a Foreign Country, 13 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 987 (1964); Ramazani, Choice-of-Law
Problems and International Oil Contracts: A Case Study, 11 INT'L & CoUT. L.Q. 503
(1962); Verdross, The Status of Foreign Private Interests Stemming from Economic
Development Agreements with Arbitration Clauses, 18 ZErrscmu FUR AUSLANDISHES
oFFENTmncuEs REcsrr uN VOLKEmBClGT (Ger.) 635 (1959); Wall, The Iranian-Italian
Oil Agreement of 1957, 7 INT'L & CoMiP. L.Q. 736 (1957). It is to be noted that the
fact that a state-owned agency and not a state is party to the contract does not change
the character of the contract as a state contract. The state-owned agency is to be
identified with the state for this purpose.
30. For the use of this term in connection with the proper law of the contract, -see
Lalive, supra note 29, at 998.
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ister being of a special kind.31
There are two cases which lend support to this type of system,
namely Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco) 32 and the
Sapphire-NIOC arbitration. 33 The only other direct evidence that
such a system is used is found in the ad hoc tribunals which operate
in isolation from any other municipal system and do not satisfy the
requirements for being characterized as tribunals of the international
legal system. Where a state accepts arbitration by a transnational
tribunal, it is conceivable that this may operate as a waiver of the
rule of local remedies.
B. Choice of the Proper Law of the Contract
The choice of the proper law of the contract will naturally depend
upon the forum which has jurisdiction in the case. It must be conceded,
however, that most forums would apply a conflicts rule based either
on the "objectivist" or "subjectivist" theory of the proper law. Gen-
erally either theory could lead to the same result.
Two questions arise here: what choice of law rules should transna-
tional tribunals adopt, and what is the proper law that may be
chosen. In the Sapphire-NIOC arbitration, the arbitrator adverted to
the first problem. He referred to the conflict between the view that
the arbitrator must apply the private international law of the seat
of the arbitration and the view that he was not so bound but had to
discover the common intention of the parties by the use of connect-
ing factors generally used in doctrine and case law without reference
to national peculiarities. 34 He also indicated that the latter argument
had special force where the parties had merely indicated the author-
ity who should appoint the umpire or sole arbitrator and had not
chosen a specific seat for the tribunal.35 He found it unnecessary to
choose between the two views, however, because he found that the
choice of law rule of the seat of the arbitration satisfied the test
propounded by the other view.
It is submitted that the second view is the better one, not merely
in the case where the parties have not specifically chosen a seat for
the arbitration, but in all cases where it is clear that the tribunal is
of a transnational nature. The appropriate question is whether the
31. The "quasi-international" system which is implied in the views of certain writers
is of a somewhat different nature. For these views see VEanDoss, op. cit. supra note 29,
at 355; Bourquin, supra note 29.
32. 27 Int'l L. Rep. 117, 165 (1958).
33. Supra note 29.
34. Ibid. The latter view is supported by BA=rYoL, REVUE DE L'Atm3ImAcE 111
(1957), and CAEAmBER, L'AnBiTRACE INTERNATONAL DE DnOrr PrnsV 50, 92 (1960).
35. Supra note 29.
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tribunal belongs to a specific municipal legal system or to the trans-
national system. The answer to this will depend upon all the circum-
stances of the case. Generally, if the tribunal is disconnected from a
specific municipal legal system, the tribunal will be a transnational
one.
In both Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co.36 and the Sap-
phire-NIOC arbitration3 the tribunals, being transnational, seem
to have applied choice of law rules which were not necessarily those
of a given municipal system. These rules were more in accordance
with the view that effect must be given to the common intention of
the parties by the use of connecting factors generally used in doctrine
and case law without reference to national peculiarities.
In the former case, both Saudi Arabian law and general principles
of law were held to govern the contract according to this test. In
the latter case, although Iran was the locus contractus and locus
solutionis of the contract, it was found for various reasons that
Iranian law was not chosen by the parties; but general principles of
law, based upon reason and the common practice of civilized nations,
were held to govern.
Modern trends have also raised problems in connection with the
law that a tribunal may use to govern the substance of the contract,
whether it be a tribunal of a municipal system or the transnational
system. 38 The fact that the municipal law of the state, or more than
one state may be chosen as the proper law offers no problem.
Difficulties arise, however, when other systems are put in issue as
competitors in the choice of the proper law. Thus, it may be argued
that the proper law may be supplied by three other systems, individ-
ually or in combination: (1) the legal systems set up by the contract
itself and thus sui generis, (2) international law, or (3) transnational
law.
Some authorities contend that important international contracts
create a legal system of their own-an independent legal order-
which regulates the relations between the parties exhaustively. Such
a system is said to result from their concordant wills.39 This argument
was used by Aramco in Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co.
40
36. Sitpra note 32, at 165. The fact that the tribunal preferred to apply the "objec-
tive" theory, supra note 32, at 167, does not change the view taken here, since the
practical effect of both theories would appear to be the same where there is no express
choice of law.
37. Supra note 29.
38. See especially Lalive, supra note 29, at 991; Mann, The Proper Law of Contracts
Concluded by International Persons, 35 BrT. YB. INT' L. 34, 41 (1959); McNair,
The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33 BrT. YB. INT'L
L. 1 (1957); Ramazani, supra note 29, at 506.
39. See Bourquin, supra note 29; Verdross, supra note 29.
40. See Lalive, supra note 29, at 997.
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As pointed out by Lalive, however, this theory is not satisfactory
because it appears artificial and begs the question. A contract cannot
remain in a vacuum; it must be inserted into a pre-existing legal order,
such legal order being either clearly defined or ascertainable by way
of legal or judicial interpretation. 41
International law has often been expressly referred to as the gov-
erning law in contracts.42 As stated by the tribunal in Saudi Arabia
v. Arabian American Oil Co., however, a contract between a state
and a private corporation cannot be governed by public international
law.43 This is true because the contract does not become one which
belongs to the international legal system.
However, the reference to international law must be given meaning,
and the only meaning it can have is that principles of international
law become applicable. A similar effect is brought about when
there is a reference to "general principles of law," or when the
general circumstances of the contract point to such general principles
of law as being applicable. When "international law" or "general
principles law" are chosen as the proper law of the contract, it would
appear that a specific legal system is being invoked which may be
called "transnational law."44 It is in this sense that Lord Asquith's
resort to the general principles of law as a modern law of nature45
in the Abu Dhabi arbitration must be understood. The term "trans-
national" is novel, but it is a satisfactory denomination for the law
which the above reference covers.
This "transnational law" constitutes a category of legal system
which is not public international law nor a peculiar municipal law.
As Lord McNair has stated, such a system which is appropriate to
certain international contracts "is not public international law, but
shares with public international law a common source of recruitment
and inspiration, namely the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations."46 However, it is worth emphasizing that its status
is more like that of municipal legal systems.
This system of law was resorted to, in effect, though not sub eo
nomine, as the proper law of the contract in the Sapphire-NIOC
arbitration. In determining whether breach by one party gave the
other party both the right to be released from its obligations and a
right to damages (including assessment of the amount of damages),4
41. Id. at 998.
42. Id. at 999.
43. Supra note 32. Contra, Mann, supra note 38, at 41.
44. See Lalive, supra note 29, at 988, for a fuller discussion of this.
45. Arbitration Between Petroleum Dev. Ltd. and Abu Dhabi (1951), in 1 INT'L &
Comfl,. L.Q. 247, 251 (1952).
46. McNair, supra note 38, at 6.
47. See the Sapphire-NIOC arbitration, supra note 29, at 1015.
[ VOL. 20
STATE TRADING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
the arbitrator used general principles of law. In- Saudi -Arabia' v.
Arabian American Oil Co. general principles, of law were also applied
as the proper law.
The justification for postulating such a system would seem to
lie in the fact that practice seems to have led to the choice of a
system of this kind as the governing law. It would seem that there
are certain kinds of contracts made between states and private
entities or individuals in which the parties do seriously contemplate
that some system of law other than a specific national system should
be applicable. Some contracts concerned with complex economic
relations may fall into this category. The main reason for the parties
contemplating such a neutral system as the governing law would
appear to rest on the alien's fear that, if the law of the state-party
were used, legislative changes might affect the contract. Perhaps
the contract could not have been concluded had no protection been
given to the alien's interest in having an assurance of some legal
security against such legislative changes by the state-party.48
The content of this law in its bearing on contracts can, of course,
only be determined by comparative studies of the existing legal
systems for the purpose of extracting general principles. In practice
it appears that much would depend on the finding of principles
common to the municipal systems of the parties to the contract.49
The conclusion would seem to be inevitable that "transnational
law," as defined above, is an appropriate competitor for the choice
as to the proper law of a state trading with an alien.
V. Tm PROBLEM OF PROTECrION BY NATIONAL STATES
A. Recognizing the Individual as an International Person
It may be argued that the individual should be given an interna-
tional personality for the purposes of the law concerning contracts
with state trading entities as part of the law of alien treatment.
Then the individual would have both substantive and remedial
rights at international law. It would be possible to regard injury to
an individual which is a breach of international law as a violation
of the international rights of the individual. The remedial rights
would also be vested in the individual, though the actual procedure
of enforcing such rights before international tribunals may still be
dependent upon the consent of the immediate parties to the dispute
and the constitution of the tribunal concerned. The individual would
have the right of bringing his own claim against the foreign state
at international law.
48. Id. at 1012.
49. This question clearly needs careful study and deeper analysis.
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The reason for giving the individual such recognition is that the
realities of the situation point to such a position. It is eminently
clear that it is the individual's interests that are primarily affected
where state responsibility is incurred in connection with state trading
contracts. The logical extension of this reality would be to give the
individual legal personality. Such recognition is highly desirable,
but the states may not be really ready to take this step because they
are more concerned about protecting their own interests as respon-
dents than they are about protecting the interests of aliens.
Recognition of the individuals legal personality would bring about
several changes in the actual law relating to state responsibility for
injuries to aliens. The whole basis of diplomatic protection would have
to be revised, and one question which would have to be answered is
whether the state's interest as the indirect victim of an illegality
committed upon an alien should be recognized in addition to the
interest of the alien. Among other things, a Calvo Clause 0 would
certainly have the effect of taking away the individual's international
right of recourse to an international tribunal. This would be so
regardless of the lack of effect on the possible interest of the alien's
national state which interest would then have to be divorced from
that of the alien in its content. To take another example, the rules
relating to nationality of claims51 would not apply to the bringing
of a claim by an individual alien. It would also be possible for the
alien effectively to agree to a waiver of the rule of local remedies;
hence, a dispute may be brought directly before an international
forum.
Since the states are not yet prepared to face such far-reaching
changes, improvement of the law may have to be contemplated within
a more limited framework. Short of full recognition being given to
the alien as a subject of international law, there are innovations which
will help to improve his position. Yet even innovation will require
the recognition of the interests of the alien as such.
The bringing of a claim in an international tribunal arising out of
the responsibility of a state for an injury to an alien is in reality a
means of enforcing protection of the alien's interests. Nevertheless,
today the claim has to be brought within the framework of diplomatic
protection-a framework which postulates an injury to the alien's
national state. The law relating to the bringing of claims arising
from injuries to aliens is an amalgam of rules deriving from a variety
of principles, including the principle that an injury to the alien is no
more nor less than an injury to his national state.
50. For a discussion of this clause see SHEA, Tr CALVO CLAUSE (1955).
51. On these rules see vAN PANHUYs, TIIE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 59 (1959).
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In view of the fact that there is little logical consistency in the
present rules, an attempt may be made to give more prominence to
the interests of the alien while still recognizing the framework upon
which the present law rests. Further, logical inconsistency would
result if the basic premise is the principle that it is a state's right that
is violated by an injury to an alien. But logical inconsistency is
often justified on the grounds of social policy and convenience.
It is submitted that states may be prepared to accept the position
where, although an injury to an alien is regarded as an injury to his
national state, it is also recognized that the alien's substantive rights
are infringed though his procedural rights may be limited. On this
basis it may be suggested that as long as the alien has the nationality
of some state other than the respondent state at the time of the
injury, he may bring a claim in his own right at international law
before an international tribunal without any need for espousal of
his claim by his state. Although his national state would also have a
right of redress in the appropriate circumstances as at present, the
alien's right to remedial action would not be dependent upon the
exercise of that state's right.
Under this theory stateless persons will still not receive protection.
However, this is a defect of the present law which will be difficult
to remedy unless states are fully prepared to recognize the interna-
tional personality of the individual. It cannot be remedied as long
as the principle that the injury to an alien is an injury to his national
state is considered to be basic.
The proposed rule does, however, eliminate many of the limitations
of the nationality-of-claims rule, such as the requirement that there
must be continuous nationality. The fact that the alien also has the
nationality of the respondent state should not make any difference.
But there a modification may be introduced: only if the alien is more
closely connected with another state of nationality than the respondent
state should the injury be regarded as having been done to an alien
for the purpose of giving him the right to bring a claim.
The forum will be an international tribunal; but like all international
tribunals, its constitution and jurisdiction will depend upon consent.
Consent must be given both by the alien or the state whose nationality
he enjoys at the time of the injury and by the respondent state. The
necessary consent may be given either before or after the wrong.
If a tribunal has not been previously constituted, it would be-better
if the alien and not his national state has the power of consent, for
he will then not be dependent upon its goodwill for a remedy. Such
an innovation would not necessarily affect the rule of local remedies.
Garcia Amador in his Revised Draft for the International Law
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Commission of 1961 does recognize that the alien should have
certain rights to bring international claims for the injury to him,
while not denying that his national state also has certain rights to
bring a claim.52 If a tribunal has been constituted by agreement
between the respondent state and the alien, the alien may submit a
claim to such tribunal without the consent of his national state.
The Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes spon-
sored by the World Bank also contains provisions which give the
alien the right to submit a claim to the Centre.53 This right is de-
pendent upon the condition that his national state and the respondent
state have signed the Convention, and that there is an agreement
between him and the respondent state to submit the dispute to the
Centre. The jurisdiction of the Centre extends only to legal disputes
arising directly out of an investment.
In the past, moreover, there have been examples of individuals'
being permitted to bring claims before special arbitral tribunals con-
stituted by agreements between their national states and respondent
states. In many instances, though not in all, the jurisdiction of the
tribunal has been based upon the traditional rules relating to nation-
ality of claims.
Also worthy of mention are the various "transnational" tribunals
which have exercised jurisdiction. Because these have not been
conceded the status of tribunals of the international legal system,
however, they remain quasi-municipal tribunals.
The trend seems to be towards giving recognition of some kind to
the individual as an international person, though there has been no
systematic acceptance of this position. Even so, in the case of Garcia
Amador's Revised Draft it is not clear to what extent the traditional
rules relating to the nationality of claims have been rejected. Al-
though the World Bank Convention is more explicit in its rejection
of these traditional rules it uses a criterion different from the one
submitted above.55
It cannot be doubted that the World Bank Convention is clearly an
advance in an important but limited field in which aliens are involved.
52. Articles 21 and 22, 2 INT'L L. CoNmi' Yn. 46, 49 (1961).
53. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, March 18, 1965, art. 25, in 4 INTr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 532,
536 (1965) [hereinafter cited as World Bank Convention].
54. See, e.g., the Central American Court of Justice (1907-1917); arbitral tribunals
set up under the Treaty of Versailles (1919-20), arts. 297 and 304; The Arbitral
Tribunal of Upper Silesia (1922); the Court of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, set up in chapter IV of the Treaty of 1951.
55. Article 25(2) requires nationality of a contracting state and absence of nationality
of the respondent state on the date on which the parties consented to submit the dispute
to the Centre and on the date of the registration of the request. World Bank Con-
vention, art. 25(2).
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Garcia Amador's Revised Draft may also be an advance. But it is
submitted that concession of personality to the alien could be
explicitly independent of the traditional rules relating to nationality
of claims. The criterion adopted by the World Bank Convention
does not, perhaps, go far enough.
56
B. Treating Breach of Contract as a Breach of International Law
The recognition of the personality of the alien can also have effects
in the substantive sphere of the law. Particularly in the field of
contracts (including trading contracts) between aliens and states,
modem trends have shown a general dissatisfaction with the tradi-
tional view that a breach of a state contract with an alien is not
per se a breach of international law.57 As a result of this view, state
r-esponsibility for breach of contract which does not involve a
breach of international law is contingent upon the satisfaction of
other requirements. Such contracts, therefore, exist at a municipal
level and generally have been subject to the municipal courts and
the law of the contracting state.
Although this position prejudiced aliens to the extent that they
could not avoid the peculiarities of the municipal law of the state-
party and its legislative changes and were not directly protected
by international law, it has been somewhat mitigated by modern
trends. The acceptance of transnational jurisdiction and a transna-
national law to which a contract between a state and an alien may be
subject has achieved for the alien a certain immunity from the law
of the state-party and from its legislative changes. This does not
in any way prejudice the equitable interests of the state-party, since
both parties are subjected to the same system of law, and since trans-
national law can certainly give value to the special interests of states
to the same extent as can the international legal system.
The development does not, however, go far enough, perhaps, in
so far as the alien is still not given the direct protection of interna-
tional law by the elevation of his contractual relations to the inter-
national level. But the creation of a transnational jurisdiction may
also appear to be the creation of an unnecessary fifth wheel. Were
the alien to be given international personality for contractual purposes,
contracts between an alien and a state would automatically exist at
an international level and directly within the international legal
56. Also, adequate rules to improve on those already in existence have to be
developed to deal with juristic persons. See World Bank Convention, art. 25(2). On
the existing law see Jones, Claims on Behalf of Nationals Who are Shareholders in
Foreign Companies, 26 Barr. YB. INT'L L. 225 (1949).
57. See Amerasinghe, State Breaches of Contracts with Aliens and International Law,
58 Ar. J. INT'L L. 881 (1964).
1967 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
system. Both parties would then have rights and duties under interna-
tional law.
Breach of contract by either party would then become a breach
of international law and would be subject to international adjudica-
tion, irrespective of the question of the proper law of the contract.
The governing law of the contract might turn out to be a municipal
law, international law, or a combination of these. This international
adjudication would also be separate from the need to exhaust local
remedies-which would remain as a procedural requirement, unless
waived. The point is that an international tribunal could adjudicate
on a dispute arising from the contract as a direct breach of contract
and not merely as a question whether, for instance, justice has
been denied or remedies have not been provided.
The recognition of the alien's international personality for con-
tractual purposes, therefore, would place the alien in a position of
contractual equality with the state within the international legal
system. Such recognition does not necessarily deprive the state of
any special rights it may have at international law in connection with
contracts with aliens.5
C. Invoking the Rule of Local Remedies
The rule of local remedies relates to the procedure of international
claims. It is clear that in its essence the rule is a concession to the
respondent state, for it permits the state-party to settle the dispute
by its own judicial means before the proper tribunals of the interna-
tional legal system can exercise jurisdiction over any aspect of the
dispute which arises from the violation of international law.
This unusual privilege may seem rather anomalous in the context
of abstract juristic theory. It may be questioned whether a party to
a dispute should even be given the privilege of righting its wrong
in its own way, before an appropriate tribunal of the legal system is
permitted to adjudicate the dispute. Looked at in this way, the nature
of the concession involved in the rule becomes eminently clear. It
is the result of exceptional sanctity being attached to state sovereignty
or to the state as a sovereign entity.
At the same time, these considerations point to the importance of
limitations being placed on the application of the rule so that the
ends of international justice are not frustrated. Hence, the require-
ment that only judicial methods are contemplated by the rule cannot
58. The view that a contract may be internationalized under the present law is not
acceptable. See ibid. The so-called "internationalization" which is said to take place
under the present law, see Mann, supra note 38, at 43, can only be brought about by
the above theoretical and practical adjustment which is fundamental. What happens
today is different.
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be underestimated if an equitable balance is to be maintained. Other
limitations, such as those emanating from the concepts of jurisdic-
tional connection and direct injury, and those relating to the exhaus-
tion of procedural remedies, are equally effective means of preventing
the rule from becoming a weapon of partiality.
Ideally speaking, from the point of view of the integrity of the
legal system, it may appear that a rule of this kind tends to detract
from the appropriate powers of the international legal system and is,
therefore, detrimental to the community interest. But this kind of
logic is not likely to be appreciated in a community where the
interests of the sovereign state are still the measure of legal efficacy.
Such a submission must certainly point up the less-developed nature
of the international legal system.
However desirable it may be that, in the interests of the maturity
of the international legal system, the rule of local remedies should be
dispensed with, it is unlikely that the rule will lose its strength. Even
the World Bank Convention contains a reference to the requirement
that local remedies should be exhausted as a condition precedent to
the jurisdiction of the Centre, if a state accepts the Centre's jurisdiction
on this condition.5 9 But it is equally interesting to note that the
Convention is based upon the position that the rule is excluded unless
it is expressly invoked. This may be considered some kind of an
advance towards more open recognition of the proper adjudicatoy
rights of international organs.
As long as the rule exists, the privileged position of the state as
a respondent must be recognized. Although it may appear that the
alien is merely being equated to the national of that state, the
fact is that the position of the alien is somewhat different from that
of a national-he is an alien, and his position brings into play an
international or non-national element which vis-a'-vis the state may
properly require special treatment by that very fact. It would not
be a correct assessment of the situation to regard him as a full member
of the state to which he has come so that he must be put in a position
similar to that of nationals.
The fact that the rule is likely to be invoked by respondent states
wherever possible warrants the caution that it should be kept within
its proper bounds. The stage has not been reached when its applica-
bility can be totally or catagorically rejected. It must, therefore, be
used in accordance with the limits of its purpose.
59. World Bank Convention, art. 26.
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